Les conciles, qui font partie de la vie de l’Eglise depuis les temps les plus anciens, sont fortement marqués par leur contexte culturel respectif, de sorte que l’institution a subi, au fil des siècles, nombre de changements extérieurs. Malgré cela, une même essence est reconnaissable. Ainsi, pour tous les conciles, il s’agit d’établir et de constater un consensus tant en matière de discipline ecclésiastique que dans les questions de foi. C’est en ce sens que les anciens conciles entendaient être le (...) lieu d’émergence d’un double consensus, horizontal et vertical. Malgré les aléas de l’histoire, qui malmenèrent souvent cet idéal consensuel, les conciles veulent avoir en commun avec l’Eglise leur caractère à la fois divin et humain.Councils, which have been part of the Church’s life since the earliest times, have been strongly marked by their respective cultural contexts, which has resulted in a number of exterior changes in the institution over the centuries. In spite of this, the same essence is recognizable. Thus, the point for all the councils has been to establish and state a consensus concerning ecclesiastical discipline, as well as questions of faith. It is in this sense that the early councils were understood as being the place where a twofold consensus – horizontal and vertical – would emerge. Despite the accidents of history, which often made it difficult to achieve this consensual ideal, the councils have sought to share with the Church their divine and human character. (shrink)

Anläßlich ihres 75-jährigen Jubiläums hat die Philosophisch-Theologische Hochschule Sankt Georgen in Frankfurt am Main am 19. und 20. Oktober 2001 eine Tagung zu "Vernünftig. Ansätze gegenwärtiger Religionsphilosophie" veranstaltet, deren wissenschaftlicher Ertrag mit diesem Band öffentlich zur Diskussion gestellt wird. In zwei thematischen Einheiten haben zuerst Philosophen und dann Theologen neue Überlegungen aus ihren Forschungsgebieten vorgetragen und aktuelle Fragestellungen referiert, auf die jeweils ein Vertreter der anderen Fakultät mit kritischen Anfragen erwidert hat. Alle Gesprächseinheiten dieser Art bilden den ersten Teil des (...) vorliegenden Bandes (C.S. Evans/A. Kreiner, P. Valadier/M. Sievernich, F. Ricken/M. Kehl; D. Böhler/H. de Ternay, H.-J. Höhn/M. Dreyer, J.A. Martínez Camino/H.-D. Mutschler, H. Verweyen/J. Splett). Darüber hinaus enthält der Band Beiträge aus dem Kreis der Teilnehmer, die auf die Diskussionen während der Tagung zurückgehen. Zwei geistesgeschichtlich orientierte Aufsätze eröffnen diesen zweiten Teil (R.M.W. Stammberger, R. Berndt). Zwei weitere Texte unterziehen zeitgenössische religionsphilosophische Entwürfe einer kritischen Analyse (G. Kruck, H.-L. Ollig), bevor systematische Skizzen das Buch abschließen (H. Watzka, R. Audi, R. Wimmer). (shrink)

W liście do B. Russella z 19 VIII 1919 r. L. Wittgenstein pisze: „Zasadniczy sprawy jest teoria o tym, co można wypowiedzieć w zdaniach - to znaczy za pomocy języka -, a czego nie można wyrazić w zdaniach lecz tylko pokazać. Jest to, moim zdaniem, główny problem filozofii." Tym właśnie problemem zajmuje się w swojej pracy H. Watzka, wykładowcy historii filozofii w Wyższej Szkole Filozoficzno-Teologicznej Sankt Georgen we Frankfurcie nad Menem. Omawiana książka jest skróconą wersją rozprawy doktorskiej: Logik und Metaphysik. (...) Zur Statusbestimmung der Philosophie bei Wittgensein, obronionej przez Autora w 1997 roku w Uniwersytecie Humboldta w Berlinie. (shrink)

Cet article explore la conception spinozienne du rapport entre substance et mode en analysant les notions de cause de soi, de cause immanente et de puissance. Nous soutenons que la théorie spinozienne de la causalité constitue une tentative pour développer une ontologie relationnelle de la puissance dans laquelle toute dénomination intrinsèque est fondée sur une dénomination extrinsèque. Par opposition à une interprétation courante selon laquelle la substance de Spinoza est une sorte de grande monade dans laquelle toutes choses inhèrent comme (...) les prédicats inhèrent à un sujet logique, nous maintenons que l’ontologie de l’immanence opère une extériorisation radicale de l’être : pour un mode fini, « exister » est s’extérioriser en tant que cause, c’est-à-dire agir. La substance, en revanche, n’est rien que la causalité en tant que telle, ou une forme absolue de l’extériorité. Par conséquent, quand Spinoza maintient que toutes choses sont « en Dieu » , la préposition in ne signifie pas s’intérioriser « dans un sujet » , mais plutôt s’extérioriser « dans l’action » .In this paper, I explore Spinoza’s conception of the relation between substance and mode through an analysis of the notions of self-causation, immanent causation and power. I argue that Spinoza’s theory of causality constitutes an attempt to develop a relational ontology of power where all intrinsic denominations are grounded in extrinsic ones. In opposition to a current reading according to which Spinoza’s substance is similar to a huge monad in which things inhere in the same way as predicates inhere in a logical subject, I argue that the ontology of immanence implies a radical exteriorization of being : for a finite mode, « to be » is to exteriorize itself as a cause, i.e. to act. As for substance, it is nothing but causality or action as such, an absolute form of exteriority. Hence, when Spinoza maintains that all things are « in God » , the preposition does not signify the interiorization « in a subject » , but rather an exteriorization « in action ». (shrink)

In his account of the individuation and creation of thinking in Difference and Repetition Gilles Deleuze claims that there belongs “an experience of death.” What does this mean and imply for an attempt to come to terms with Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism? The following article presents a reading that explores this question, arguing that Deleuze’s account of what it means to think has two aspects that must be understood in relation to each other. On the one hand, Deleuze’s ontology of intensive (...) difference involves an image of human individuation grounded upon a “death present in the living.” On the other hand, Deleuze writes that in the creation of “thinking in thought” there is an experience of death. Understanding the relation between the individuating aspect of death – as the emergence of the pure and empty form of time as the basis for representational thinking and judgement – and the experience of this individuating factor in the creation of thinking in thought, Deleuze’s claim can be made sense of and its centrality in his system clarified. When death as an individuating factor becomes experience, thinking is transmuted from dead representation to intensive life, and transcendental empiricism is operationalized. (shrink)

There is ongoing ethical and legal debate about withdrawing life sup- port for patients with disorders of consciousness (DOCs). Frequently fu- eling the debate are implicit assumptions about the value of life in a state of impaired consciousness, and persistent uncertainty about the quality of life (QoL) of these persons. Yet there are no validated methods for assessing QoL in this population, and a significant obstacle to doing so is their inability to communicate. Recent neuroscientific discoveries might circumvent that problem (...) and help shed light on QoL in DOCs. There is an ethical imperative to prioritize QoL research in this patient population, to provide evidence to inform treatment, research, and end of life decisions. A minimalist and pragmatic model of QoL is proposed, targeting positive and negative affect as domains for which there is po- tential to reach across the communication gap, and restore to these voiceless persons some measure of control. (shrink)

Conscious but incapacitated patients need protection from both undertreatment and overtreatment, for they are exceptionally vulnerable, and dependent on others to act in their interests. In the United States, the law prioritizes autonomy over best interests in decision making. Yet U.S. courts, using both substituted judgment and best interests decision making standards, frequently prohibit the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from conscious but incapacitated patients, such as those in the minimally conscious state, even when ostensibly seeking to determine what patients would (...) have wanted. In the United Kingdom, under the Mental Capacity Act of 2005, courts decide on the best interests of incapacitated patients by, in part, taking into account the past wishes and values of the patient. This paper examines and compares those ethicolegal approaches to decision making on behalf of conscious but incapacitated patients. We argue for a limited interpretation of best interests such that the standard is properly used only when the preferences of a conscious, but incapacitated patient are unknown and unknowable. When patient preferences and values are known or can be reasonably inferred, using a holistic, all-things-considered substituted judgment standard respects patient autonomy. (shrink)

Bernat argues for a unified brain-based determination of death (UBDD), noting that it “conceptually justifies” death determination both in Donation after Circulatory Determination of Death (DCDD) a...

It remains unclear what patient advocacy actually entails and what values it ought to embody. It will be useful to ascertain whether advocacy means supporting any decision the patient makes, or if the advocate can claim to represent the patient by asserting well-intentioned paternalistic claims on the patient's behalf. This is especially significant because the position of advocate brings with it certain privileges on the basis of of presumed insight into patient-perceived interests, namely, entitlement to take part in clinical decision (...) making and increased professional standing. Three issues related to patient advocacy will be explored: are patient advocates necessary; what does advocacy entail, and who ought to represent patients in this way—arguments for and against prospective candidates will also be covered. The paper considers whether advocates are necessary since not only can they be dangerously paternalistic, but the salutary values advocacy embodies are already part of good professional health care. (shrink)

The increasing demand for horticultural products for nutritional and economic purposes by lesser developed countries (LDC's) is well-documented. Technological demands of the LDC's producing horticultural products is also increasing. Pesticide use is an integral component of most agricultural production, yet chemicals are often supplied without supplemental information vital for their safe and efficient implementation. Illiteracy rates in developing countries are high, making pesticide education even more challenging. For women, who perform a significant share of agricultural tasks, illiteracy rates are even (...) higher than for men. The dilemma exists of how a developing country can improve its nutritional and economic situation without giving consideration to social and environmental consequences. (shrink)

This collection of articles pays homage to the creativity and scientific rigor Jerome Singer has brought to the study of consciousness and play. It will interest personality, social, clinical and developmental psychologists alike.

The topic of time is central to Levinas's philosophy. By examining aspects of the Biblical stories of Abraham and Moses compared with Greek myths, mainly that of Cronos devouring his children, this paper aims to show that Levinas's view of time, though certainly indebted to the Greek (i.e. philosophical) tradition, contains traces of Biblical experiences. Moreover, Levinas's interpretation of time will serve as a concrete demonstration of the way the Jewish experience enables Levinas to express his criticism of the philosophical-Greek (...) tradition. (shrink)

It is argued that human needs are not facts (properties, states, processes, relations) about people, but are values. The reasons presented for this position are (1) that needs are goal oriented and goals are things people value, (2) that ‘need’ functions as a basic motivational term, and (3) that disagreements about what people need are disagreements in attitude toward, and emotional attachment to, things variously considered to be valuable. If human needs are not facts, then, of course, health or medical (...) needs are not. Viewing health or medical needs as discoverable facts, rather than values, engenders certain difficulties in the following areas of concern: (a) Deciding when surgery is necessary and when unnecessary; (b) Defining the concepts of health and disease; (c) Evaluating some consequences of the development of medical science and technology; and (d) Understanding the alleged conflict between patients' health needs and their human rights. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Concussion is a common, serious injury in youth ice hockey, affecting up to 25% of players per season by one estimate. • Bodychecking is a major cause of injury and concussion in hockey, yet some Canadian provinces allow players as young as nine years to engage in bodychecking. • Reducing rates of concussion requires eliminating bodychecking for all except elite hockey players aged 16 years and older, as per the recommendations of the Canadian Academy of Sports and Exercise Medicine.

Includes text of Gommaṭasāra Jīva-Kāṇḍa in Prakrit with English and Hindi translation.

The present study is the result of two questions which arose in dealing with the Critique of Pure Reason. What is the relationship of the “Doctrine of Method” to the “Doctrine of Elements?” Does the “Doctrine of Method” tell us anything important about Kant and his philosophy? It will be the contention of this paper that the second half of the Critique relies heavily on the “Doctrine of Elements,” and is a natural expansion of the first half of the Critique. (...) In effect, this is a tentative denial of Norman Kemp Smith’s patchwork thesis. With respect to the second question mentioned above, we shall see that Kant does have a very special place for methodology in his philosophy. This methodology of philosophy has implications for a theory of the division of the sciences and the method proper to each of them. (shrink)

Carole Pearce's argument against African philosophy is founded on a set of factual flaws and the fallacious assumption that African philosophy is equivalent to ethnophilosophy, which she defines as a form of intellectual apartheid founded on irrational belief systems. I argue that African philosophy is in no way qualitatively different from, say, French or Chinese philosophy, and that ethnophilosophy is merely one aspect of it But ethnophilosophy could play the important role of critically evaluating African ethnic belief systems and the (...) interpretation of such by Western anthropologists. In general, African philoso phy is nothing more than the philosophical research (of whatever order) carried out by African philosophers in the context of African research paradigms. (shrink)

Some philosophers—call them pessimists–think we have reason to avoid deferring to testimony to settle our questions in domains where deep understanding is important. Extant defences of pessimism focus on whether deferring to testimony is ever sufficient for acquiring understanding. But I argue that these defences/articulations of pessimism are unsatisfactory. Even if deference to testimony were always insufficient for acquiring understanding—which seems doubtful—this would not explain why we have reason to avoid deferring in certain domains. Instead, I claim we should think (...) about how and when testimony can disincentivize and discourage agents’ coming to understand. I argue that deferring to testimony to settle a question often results in one having less reason to seek broader understanding and thereby sets one up to (continue to) lack understanding. The incentive pessimist appeals to this phenomenon to explain and defend the basic pessimist thought. (shrink)